9/11 Report Summary-Currently: Hijacking of AA 11

[Puck]

I bought the 9/11 Commission Report. I have decided that many of you will probably not read it, but since I have found the first chapter outstanding, I am going to begin posting summaries of each chapter. I am going to start yall off with the basic timelines. Feel free to look through it whenever you feel like it. I will be as fair and balanced as you would expect from (but rarely receive) a reporter. All info is pulled directly from the report and will not be edited AT ALL except if it ensures better clarity.

TIMELINES:*

American Airlines Flight 11(AA 11)
(Boston to Los Angeles)

7:59- Takeoff
8:14- Last routine radio
8:19- Flight attendant notifies AA of hijacking
8:21- Transponder turned off (signal letting controll towers veiw info on plane)
8:23- AA attempts to contact the cockpit
8:25- Boston center was aware of hijacking
8:38- Boston center notifies NEADS of hijacking
8:46- NEADS scrambles Otis figher jets in search of AA 11
8:46:40- AA 11 crashes into 1 WTC (North Tower)
8:53- Otis figher jets airborne
9:16- AA headquarters is aware that Flight 11 has crashed into WTC
9:21- Boston Center advises NEADS that AA 11 is airborne heading for Washington
9:24- NEADS scrambles figher jets in search of AA 11


United Airlines Flight 175 (UA 175)
(Boston to Los Angeles)

8:14- Takeoff
8:42- Last radio communication
8:42-8:46- Likely takeover
8:47- Transponder code changes
8:52- Flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking
8:54- UA attempts to contact the cockpit
8:55- New York Center suspects hijacking
9:03:11- Flight 175 crashes into 2 WTC (south tower)
9:15- New York center advises NEADS that UA 175 was the second aircraft crashed into the WTC
9:20- UA headquarters is aware that Flight 175 has crashed into WTC


American Airlines Flight 77 (AA 77)
(Washington, D.C. to Los Angeles)

8:20- Takeoff
8:51- Last routine radio communication
8:51-8:54- Likely takeover
8:54- Flight 77 makes unauthorized turn to south
8:56- Transponder is turned off
9:05- AA headquarters aware that Flight 77 is hijacked
9:25- Herndon Command Center orders nationwide ground stop
9:32- Dulles tower observes radar of fast-moving aircraft (later identified as AA 77)
9:34- FAA advises NEADS that AA 77 is missing
9:37:46- AA 77 crashes into the Pentagon
10:30- AA headquarters confirms crash


United Airlines Flight 93 (UA 93)
(Newark to San Fransisco)

8:42- Takeoff
9:24- Flight 93 receives warning from UA about possible cockpit intrusion
9:27- Last routine radio communication
9:28- Likely takover
9:34- Herndon Command Center advises FAA headquarters that UA 93 is hijacked
9:36- Flight attendants notify UA of hijacking; UA attemtps to contact cockpit
9:41- Transponder turned off
9:57- Passenger rovolt begins
10:03:11- Flight 93 crashes in field in Shanksville, PA
10:07- Clevland Center advises NEADS of UA 93 hijacking
10:15- UA headquarters aware that Flight 93 has crashed in PA; Washington Center advises NEADS that Flight 93 has crashed in PA


*pulled from tables located on pages 32 and 33 of commision report. no data has been edited at all

[Defiant]

Sure took the people a really long time to confirm that the airplanes crashed. An hour for the DC plane!

[Republican_Man]

And nothing was attempted afterwards, huh? *sarcasm*

[IntrepidIsMe]

Just look at the report, it was nearly an hour,

[Republican_Man]

[Defiant]

[Puck]

1.1 INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS
Boarding the Flights

Boston: American 11 and United 175.
When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a com-puterized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta�s selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the air-craft. This did not hinder Atta�s plans. ( Page 1)

While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of his
hijacking team�Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri�were selected in Boston. Their selection affected only the handling of their checked bags, not their screening at the checkpoint. All five men cleared the checkpoint and made their way to the gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took their seats in business class (seats 8D, 8G, and 10B, respectively). The Shehri brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A, Waleed in 2B), in the first-class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 7:40. (Page 2)

Washing Dulles: American 77.
Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the X-ray
machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alarm, and they were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not trigger the alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off, a screener wanded him. He passed this inspection.
About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Han-jour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the Main Terminal�s west checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm,through the metal detector. A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi cleared the metal detector and was permitted through;Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that he was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket, clipped to its rim.
When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal Aviation Admin-istration (FAA) later investigated these security screening operations, the
screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary. They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees.We asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the quality of the screener�s work to have been �marginal at best.�The screener should have �resolved� what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that he did not. ( Page 3)



I will continue with a excerpt from "Newark: United 93" Later tonight....I am sure this is enough reading for the moment.

[Puck]

Newark: United 93.*

7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles.Two checked bags; two did not. Haznawi was elected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane.........

The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class section. Jarrah was in seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi in 6B.20

The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights.21 They were planning to hijack these [4] planes and turn them into large guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11,2001,they had defeated all the security layers that America�s civil aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.


*taken from page 4


[Next post will include: "The Hijacking of American 11"]

[Defiant]

Im now hosting the 9/11 report!

http://www.alidarjarok.com/911comm.pdf

Right click, save target as if you want to save it.

[Republican_Man]

[Defiant]

Bah, I also like illegally downloading things. Thats called communism. LOL. I dont support propaganda, but go ahead and download it!

[Puck]

The Hijacking of American 11*

The plane [AA 11] took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet.All communications and flight profile data were normal. About this time the �Fasten Seatbelt� sign would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun preparing for cabin service.

At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA�s air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmission, ATC instructed the aircraft�s pilots to climb to 35,000 feet.That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.

Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong and Madeline �Amy� Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the hijacking happened. As it began, some of the hijackers-most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who were seated in row 2 in first class-stabbed the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing for cabin service.

We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit; FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight. Ong speculated that they had �jammed their way� in....

The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper spray, or some other irritant in the first-class cabin, in order to force the passengers and flight attendants toward the rear of the plane.They claimed they had a bomb.

About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency aboard the flight.This was the first of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took action outside the scope of their training, which emphasized that in a hijacking, they were to communicate with the cockpit crew.The emergency call lasted approximately 25 minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground.

At 8:19, Ong reported: